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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTIONS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-2a-3 (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
Pursuant to Rule 24(b)(1) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure the Appellee shall 
present a statement of issues presented for review by the Appellant. In doing so, the 
Appellee will attempt to restate the twenty different issues presented by the Appellant 
according to the Brief of Appellant. 
1. Did the Court err in failing to stay the Utah State Court divorce proceedings 
while the Appellant's Appeal of the decision of Honorable Judge Tena Campbell 
dismissing his Petition filed under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act and 
the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, including the 
Hague Convention (hereinafter referred to as "The Hague Convention") was pending 
before the United States Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court's decision not to stay the proceedings or continue the trial is 
discretionary and should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard unless it clearly 
violated any statutory provision in which case the Court should review the decision for 
correctness. Crossland Savings v. Hatch. 877 P.2d 1241, 1243 (Utah 1994). 
2. Was the Court obligated to follow the provisions of the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Act and the Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement 
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Act? If so, did the Court violate the terms of those statutes? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
To the extent that the requirements of the uniform acts are discretionary the Court 
should apply an abuse of discretion standard. To the extent that the Court is called upon 
to interpret these Acts the Court should grant no difference to the Trial Court but review 
its decisions under a correction of error standard. Western Kane County Special Service 
District #1 v. Jackson Cattle Co.. 744 P.2d 1376, 1378 (Utah 1987). 
3. Did the Court err in failing to permit the Appellant additional time to seek 
counsel? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This decision should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion or manifest 
injustice standard. See Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
4. Does the evidence support the Court's Findings of Fact? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The party who challenges the Courts Findings of Fact "must marshal all the 
evidence in support of the Findings and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
to support the Findings in question." Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508, 516 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
This requirement to marshal the evidence as well as the broad discretion accorded 
trial judges applies to Findings and Judgments regarding child custody, support and 
property division. Shioji v. Shioil 712 P.2d 197, 210 (Utah 1985), Roberts v. Roberts, 
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835 P.2d 193, 198 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992); Rappleve v. Rappleve, 855 P.2d 260, 264 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1993); Jackson v. Jackson, 617 P.2d 338, 340-341 (Utah 1980); Breinholt v. 
Breinholt 905 P.2d 877, 882 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995); Sukin v. Sukin, 842 P.2d 922, 923 (Ut. 
Ct. App. 1992); Maughan v. Maughan. 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989) and Richie 
v. Richie. 784 P.2d 465, 468 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
5. The Appellant also raises several miscellaneous issues which may or may not 
be incorporated in the above issues including: (1) the alleged improper issuance of a 
Temporary Restraining Order; (2) whether the Commissioner had a conflict of interest; 
(3) whether the parties were required to submit to mandatory marital counselling (§30-3-
11.1 (Utah Code Annotated 1969); (4) whether the Court properly permitted the 
Appellant's participation in Court hearings by telephone and pursuant to the UUCCJEA; 
and, (5) whether or not the Court should have ordered a child abuse investigation 
pursuant to §30-3-5.2 OJ.C.A. 2001). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
These decisions are each discretionary or, if made in error did not prejudice the 
Appellant's rights below. In either case the standard of review is an abuse of discretion 
or manifest injustice standard. Maughan v. Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 159 (Ut. Ct. App. 
1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
The parties separated in March 1999 when Cory Kanth returned to Utah with the 
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parties' two minor children Malini Amstel Kanth, age 8 and Anjana Kesari Kanth, age 6. 
The parties had been residing on a temporary basis in Australia immediately prior to the 
party's separation. Thereafter Appellant, Professor Rajani Kanth, commenced his Hague 
Convention Petition in the United States District Court for the District of Utah. The case 
was set for Trial December 9, 1999. In lieu thereof Judge Tena Campbell, United States 
District Judge, decided the case based upon the record when Mr. Kanth agreed to that 
procedure. Judge Campbell dismissed Appellant's Hague Convention Petition, December 
14, 1999. 
The Appellee filed her Complaint for Divorce July 2, 1999. The Appellant, Mr. 
Kanth, filed notice of the pendency of the Hague Convention Petition and, except for 
emergency proceedings (an Application for a Protective Order) nothing substantive 
occurred in the divorce case until January 20, 2000 after Judge Campbell's Ruling. 
The Appellant sought a stay of execution of Judge Campbell's Ruling pending his 
Appeal of that decision. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the Appellant's 
request for a stay of execution. The Tenth Circuit Order denying the Appellant's request 
for a stay is dated January 19, 2000. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately 
sustained Judge Campbell's decision. The Supreme Court of the United States denied the 
Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari as well as his Request for Rehearing. 
The Trial of this matter was scheduled for and conducted on June 18, 2001. The 
Appellant appeared through counsel. Appellant's attorney requested leave to be excused 
from the proceedings. This Motion was granted based upon the Court's advice to 
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Appellant's counsel that in the absence of the Appellant or his attorney the Court would 
enter the Appellant's default if he did not wish to appear and participate in the 
proceedings. Appellant's counsel was excused and the Appellant's default was entered. 
The Court went on to take detailed evidence at the time of Trial and entered 
appropriate Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce which the 
Appellant challenges on Appeal. 
Prior to the trial the Court entertained several Motions for Temporary Relief and 
the Appellee's request for a Temporary Restraining Order on one occasion. The Decree 
grants Appellee a divorce, awards her sole custody of the parties' children and imposes 
restrictions on the Appellant's visitation rights. The Decree also divides the parties' 
property, establishes ongoing child support and spousal support and enters judgment for 
child support and temporary alimony arrearages which had accrued during the pendency 
of the action. The Decree awards attorneys' fees and a judgment for costs in favor of 
Cory Kanth. These fees cover fees incurred in the State Court divorce proceedings, the 
Hague Convention proceedings, and attorneys' fees incurred in connection with the 
Australia divorce proceedings. The total award of fees and costs was $68,540.38. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The Appellee, Cory Kanth, commenced these proceedings on July 2, 1999 by 
filing her Complaint for Divorce. (Index on Appeal pp. 1-6). 
2. July 14, 1999 Appellant, Rajani Kanth filed his Hague Convention Petition in 
the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. An initial hearing was scheduled for 
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August 24, 1999. At the time of the initial hearing a Stipulation was reached between the 
parties to the Hague Convention Federal Court action which would have resulted in the 
dismissal of that action. However, Mr. Kanth dismissed his attorney's of record and 
sought a rescission of that stipulation which was granted by Judge Tena Campbell on 
September 9, 1999. A subsequent hearing was scheduled for October 18, 1999. (Index 
on Appeal pp. 14, 15; "Order" Judge Tena Campbell, Case No. 2:99CV532C, Appellee's 
Index). 
3. Judge Campbell entered an "Order" dismissing the Appellant's Hague 
Convention Petition on December 14, 1999. Subsequently, Judge Campbell declined any 
further relief sought by Mr. Kanth because he had flied a Notice of Appeal. That Order is 
dated December 17, 1999 (Appellee's Addendum "A," U.S. District Court Order dated 
December 14, 1999; Appellee's Addendum "B,"U.S. District Court Order dated 
December 17, 1999). 
4. Following the dismissal of the Hague Convention proceedings the Appellee, 
Cory Kanth prosecuted her divorce action seeking temporary relief by way of an Order to 
Show Cause which was ultimately heard by the Court on January 20, 2000. (Index on 
Appeal pp. 20-26, 98-102). 
5. The Appellant was represented by counsel at the hearing and had moved the 
Court for an Order staying the proceedings pending the Appeal of Judge Campbell's 
Order dismissing the Hague Petition. (Index on Appeal pp. 37-38). However, the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals had denied Appellant's request for stay on January 19, 2000. 
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(Appellee's Addendum "C"). 
6. The Appellant quickly discharged his attorney and attempted to represent 
himself Pro Se in several objections, letters, and other communications. Prior to 
discharge Appellant's counsel objected to the Commissioner's Recommendation (Index 
on Appeal pp. 64-67). 
7. The Commissioner denied the Appellant's request for a stay noting that they 
Hague Convention had been dismissed and that there was no authority for the proposition 
that the Appeal should result in a stay of the State Court matters. The Commissioner 
noted that the Australia action did not preclude proceedings going forward in this matter. 
The Court went on to enter temporary relief. The Appellant had sought, through counsel, 
to raise the issue of "acquiescence" and therefore had made an appearance ostensibly as a 
"special appearance." However, the Appellee had stipulated that the Appellant's 
appearance in the State Court proceedings would not be considered acquiescence in the 
Hague proceeding. (Index on Appeal pp. 62-63). 
8. The Appellant was before the Court based upon service of Summons that 
accompanied the Complaint which was served upon him personally on August 21, 1999 
while he was in the State of Utah. (Index on Appeal pp. 12-13). 
9. At not time prior to the hearing of the Appellee's Motion for Temporary Relief 
did the Appellant raise any issue regarding a conflict of interest. Afterwards, the 
Appellant alleged that Commissioner Arnett had earlier represented him in another 
proceeding and Judge Stirba instructed the Appellant's counsel to "investigate this claim 
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and file a Motion to Recuse if that action is deemed to be appropriate." (Index on Appeal 
pp. 68-70). 
10. Commissioner Arnett subsequently voluntarily recused himself and 
Commissioner Susan C. Bradford was assigned to the case. (Index on Appeal p. 144). 
11. The Appellee sought and received a Temporary Restraining Order June 14, 
2000 which required the immediate return of the children when it appeared that the 
Appellant was preparing to remove the children from the jurisdiction of the State or the 
children may have been exposed to verbal or emotional abuse in violation of the Court's 
earlier Order. (Index on Appeal pp. 174-175). 
12. Following the July 20, 1999 hearing the parties were frequently before the 
Court on various requests for relief filed by both parties. 
13. The Appellant formally complained of Commissioner Susan C. Bradford's 
conduct resulting in her recusal from the case. (Index on Appeal p. 338). 
14. The matter was set for Pre-Trial Settlement Conference initially scheduled for 
November 6, 2000. The Appellant sought a continuance thereof. (Index on Appeal pp. 
339-342). 
15. On November 2, 2000, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit denied the appeal of Mr. Kanth. (Index on Appeal pp. 643-647). 
16. Throughout the proceedings the Appellee attempted to conduct discovery by 
way of Interrogatories, Requests and Depositions. The Appellant consistently failed to 
respond to any discovery. Ultimately, Judge Timothy R. Hanson extended discovery 
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until shortly before Trial in June 2001. Nevertheless, the Appellant failed to respond. 
17. By and large the Appellant appeared "specially" ostensibly to prevent a 
defence of "acquiescence" in the Federal Court proceedings. However, at times, the 
Appellant made a general appearance in the case. (Index on Appeal pp. 841-842, a 
Stipulation signed personally by the Appellant). 
18. On November 6, 2000, the Appellant's default was entered for his failure to 
appear at the Pre-Trial Settlement Conference because ". . . he has refused to address the 
substantive issues in this matter despite repeated requests and opportunity to do so." 
(Minutes of Pre-Trial Conference, Michael S. Evans, Index on Appeal p. 370). 
19. On December 6, 2000, the Court entertained the several objections of the 
Appellant to Commissioner's Recommendations. The Appellant's objections were 
overruled. The Court specifically found that it had jurisdiction in the matter and 
scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the issue of temporary custody for February 8, 2001 
at 9:30 a.m. At that same time the Court ordered the parties to stipulate to a custody 
evaluator by December 20, 2000. The Court continued supervised visitation. (Index on 
Appeal p. 806). 
20. The Appellant's default was entered again February 1, 2001 for his failure to 
appear. At that same time the Court denied the Appellant's objection to the February 
evidentiary hearing which had been scheduled by Judge Stirba in December. (Index on 
Appeal p. 951). 
21. On the day before the evidentiary hearing scheduled by Judge Stirba to 
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consider temporary custody, H. Russell Hettinger entered his appearance as attorney for 
the Appellant. (Index on Appeal p. 956). 
22. While attorney Hettinger initially entered a "special appearance" his 
appearance on February 8, 2001 did not preserve any rights and constituted a general 
appearance. On February 8, 2001, the Appellant's Motion to Continue the evidentiary 
hearing was granted. Appellee's Motion to Strike the Appellant's Pleadings was denied. 
All discovery was ordered completed by May 15, 2001. A two-day bench Trial was 
scheduled for June 18-19, 2001. The Appellant did not register any objection to the trial 
setting. (Index on Appeal p. 965). 
23. On April 3, 2001, the Appellant, appearing generally, sought a Restraining 
Order through counsel of record. The Restraining Order was entered prohibiting the 
Appellee from conducting the baptism of the parties' child, Malini Kanth until further 
order of the Court. A hearing was set for April 13, 2001. 
24. The April 13, 2001 hearing was heard by Judge Timothy R. Hanson. By that 
time the parties had reached a Stipulation permitting the baptism of Malini. The 
Appellant agreed at that time to undergo a psychological evaluation and to choose from 
one of the nominated evaluators by April 16, 2001 5:00 p.m. The Court vacated the 
earlier Order to conclude discovery and the custody evaluation. (Index on Appeal p. 
1036). 
25. On April 20, 2001, the Appellant filed Notice of Depositions of the Appellee 
and her mother. (Index on Appeal pp. 1044-1045). 
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26. The Court appointed Dr. Natalie Malovich to conduct a custody evaluation on 
April 3, 2001. 
27. Dr. Malovich prepared a "Psychological Evaluation and Interactive 
Assessment." However, the Appellant did not participate in that process. (Findings of 
Fact 1f23). 
28. On June 4, 2001, Judge Bruce C. Luebeck denied the Appellant's Motion to 
Stay the Proceedings or Continue the Trial. (Index on Appeal p. 1158). 
29. The Trial Court denied the Motion to Continue or Stay for the following 
reasons: 
a. The Court had personal jurisdiction over the parties and subject 
matter jurisdiction. 
b. The mere pendency of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari before the 
United States Supreme Court was not sufficient grounds to stay the 
State Court proceedings where the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
had refused Appellant's Motion for Stay. 
c. The Appellee through counsel had stipulated that the Appellee would 
waive any claim or defence of acquiescence and, in fact, the 
Appellee had not asserted any such claim in any proceedings based 
upon Mr. Kanth's appearance in the State Court Proceedings. 
d. At previous hearings in anticipation of the Trial no objection was 
made to the setting of the Trial or discovery cut off dates even 
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though the Petition for Writ of Certiorari was pending. 
e. The Court had the option to enter a provisional or interim Order 
pending any decision by the Supreme Court. 
f. It was unknown when the Supreme Court would make a decision and 
there was a need for finality of the State Court proceedings. 
g. The Court did not find that the Appellant's compliance with the 
Court's Order could be deemed "acquiescence." (Index on Appeal 
pp. 1180-1184). 
30. The Court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce August 1, 2001. (Index on Appeal pp. 1185-1227). 
31. The Appellant herein petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a 
rehearing after the United States Supreme Court denied his Petition for a Writ of 
Certiorari. (Index on Appeal pp. 1231-1238; Appellee's Addendum "D"). 
32. The United States Supreme Court denied the Motion for rehearing. 
(Appellee's Addendum "E"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Court did not err in refusing to stay the State Court proceedings and 
continue the June 18, 2001 Trial setting. The Court did not enter a temporary award of 
custody until after the dismissal of the Appellant's Hague convention proceeding. 
Thereafter, the Appellant's attempts to stay enforcement of Judge Tena Campbell's Order 
dismissing his Hague Convention proceeding were denied. The mere pendency of an 
12 
Appeal without a stay of execution of the Order dismissing the Hague Convention 
Petition is not grounds to stay State Court proceedings. The Appellant has misconstrued 
the doctrine of acquiescence in connection with Hague Convention proceedings. The 
prosecution of the State Court case did not impair the Appellant's Hague Convention 
rights. The Appellant freely took advantage of State Court proceedings when it suited 
him. He should be barred from complaining about the exercise of State Court jurisdiction 
now. The Temporary Orders of the State Court do not constitute decisions "on the 
merits" as contemplated by the Hague Convention. 
2. The various Temporary Orders of the State Court do not violate the terms of the 
Utah Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UUCCJA) or the Utah Uniform Child 
Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UUCCJEA). The UUCCJEA did not become 
effective until July 1, 2000. While the UUCCJEA does contain a clause which would 
apply its terms to international cases, by the time it was effective in this case the 
Appellant's Hague Court Petition had been dismissed. The UUCCJA was ambiguous as 
to whether it applied to international custody conflicts except when it came to 
enforcement of foreign Decrees entered in substantial compliance with the terms of the 
UCCJA. By dismissing the Appellant's Hague Convention Petition it was resolved that 
the children's "home State" or State of "habitual residence" (pursuant to the Hague 
Convention) was the United States, State of Utah and not Australia. That being the case, 
neither uniform act would have applied in this case. Prior to the dismissal of the 
Appellant's Hague Convention Petition the Utah Court was authorized to enter a custody 
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order (even though it did not) pursuant to the "vacuum jurisdiction" provisions of both 
uniform acts. 
3. The Court did not err in failing to postpone hearings or stay the State Court 
proceedings in order to permit the Appellant time to retain counsel. The Appellant was 
represented by two attorneys on two separate occasions during the State Court 
proceedings. He was represented by an attorney at the time of the Trial. There is no 
indication in the record that his claims or defences were prejudiced to any degree because 
of his voluntary failure to secure counsel at any particular time during the pendency of 
the case. 
4. The Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence and facts which would 
support the Court's Findings and his objections thereto should be denied. In spite of 
entering the default of the Appellant the Court took extensive testimony at the time 
appointed for the Trial. Based upon that evidence the Court entered detailed Findings of 
Fact. The evidence supports the Findings. The Appellant has failed to marshal the 
evidence which supports the Findings. Therefore, the Appellant's objection to the 
Findings should be dismissed and denied. 
5. The other grounds for Appeal each lack merit. The Appellant sites a number of 
other grounds as a basis for Appeal. These include: 
a. The failure of the Court to require an investigation based upon the 
Appellant's allegations of abuse. §30-3-5.2 OJ.C.A. 2001) is not 
mandatory but, rather, discretionary. In any case, the Court did 
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order a custody evaluation which would have served the purpose of 
this provision. The Appellant failed to cooperate with that 
evaluation and it proved that the children were not subject to any 
abuse. 
The Court facilitated the appearance and participation of the 
Appellant in all hearings by whatever means suited the Appellant 
whenever the Appellant chose to appear other than in person. 
Therefore, the Courts did not violate the terms of the UUCCJEA 
111(b). By that time, the terms of that act did not apply in any case 
because the Hague Convention Petition had been dismissed. 
The Court had sufficient grounds to enter the Temporary Restraining 
Order for the return of the children under the circumstances 
described in the Motion and the Appellee's Affidavit. In any case, 
the Appellant was not prejudiced. 
The Appellant failed to raise any issue regarding conflict of interest 
regarding Commissioner Arnett until after the hearing. When the 
issue was raised Commissioner Arnett voluntarily recused himself. 
There was no prejudice. 
The mandatory counselling requirements of §30-3-11.1 (U.C.A. 
1969) have never been implemented or enforced by the Court. 
Any other requests for relief or grounds for Appeal sited by the 
15 
Appellant are incorporated in the above or are unintelligible and 
cannot be responded to. 
ARGUMENT 
I THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO STAY THE 
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS AND CONTINUE THE JUNE 
18, 2001 TRIAL SETTING. 
The Appellant generally asserts that because he filed his Hague Convention 
Petition after these divorce proceedings were commenced the State Court proceedings 
should abate pending a resolution of the issues raised by his Federal Court Petition. 
Article 16 of the Hague Convention provides: 
"Article 16: After receiving notice of a wrongful removal or 
retention of a child in the sense of Article 3, the judicial or administrative 
authorities of the contracting State to which the child has been removed or 
in which the child has been retained shall not decide on the merits of rights 
of custody until it has been determined that the child is not to be returned 
under this Convention or unless an application under this Convention is not 
lodged within a reasonable time following receipt of the notice." 
The Appellant misconstrues Article 16 and its application to this case. First of all, 
it was never determined that the Appellee, Cory Kanth, wrongfully removed the children 
from their habitual residence. That was the issue before the Federal Court. It was 
decided contrary to the Petition of Mr. Kanth. 
Even if the Appellant's interpretation of Article 16 is correct, it would only inhibit 
the Utah Court from entering a custody determination up until the point that the 
Appellant's Hague Convention proceeding was dismissed. The Utah Courts made no 
custody determination until after Mr. Kanth's Hague Convention Petition was dismissed 
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and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals had denied his request to stay that Order. 
Furthermore, any temporary order of the Utah Courts regarding custody could not 
be considered a decision uon the merits" as contemplated by Article 16. Such temporary 
orders would not be final orders nor would they be based upon an evidentiary hearing. A 
hearing on the merits did not occur until June 18, 2001 at the trial. This occurred long 
after the dismissal of the Appellant's Hague Convention Petition and the rejection of his 
Appeal by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Until the U.S. Federal District Court dismissed the Appellant's Hague Convention 
Petition it was unknown which state would have jurisdiction over the custody aspects of 
this case. The purpose of the Hague Convention Petition was to determine that issue. 
The Hague Convention Petition raises the issue of the children's "habitual residence." 
The State of "habitual residence" has jurisdiction according to the Hague Convention to 
determine issues related to the custody of the children. Until that determination is made 
there would be a jurisdiction void or vacuum. 
The Appellant also suggests that the Utah State action should have been stayed and 
the trial continued because he could not participate in the proceedings without 
"acquiescing" to United States as the State of habitual residence. In so doing, the 
Appellant misconstrues the defence of "acquiescence" in Hague Convention proceedings. 
The Appellee herein did in fact raise the defence of acquiescence in the Federal Court 
proceedings. However, this defence was not based upon the Appellant's participation in 
the State Court proceedings. Rather, the defence of acquiescence referred to Mr. Kanth's 
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letter of April 5, 1999 where he indicated that "I am ready now to return to Utah and look 
for employment there, no matter what it takes." This behavior gives rise to the defence of 
acquiescence. (See, Re A and another (minors) (abduction: acquiescence) [1992] I ALL 
ER 929, CA; [1992] FAM. 106 and Appellee's Brief before the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Appellee's Addendum "F".) It should be noted that Appellant's habit of making 
"special appearances" had nothing to do with the Court's lack of jurisdiction over the 
subject matter or the Appellant. The Appellant was duly served with a Summons and 
Complaint while he was in the State of Utah and he never contested the Court's 
jurisdiction. 
The Appellant offers no authority for the proposition that an appeal of the 
dismissal of a Hague Convention Petition, where no stay of execution has been entered, 
would prohibit the State Court from entering a custody Order because of Article 16 of the 
Convention. Even so, the Utah Trial Court was mindful of the pending Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari before the United States Supreme Court and "left the door open" to 
reconsider its custody order in the event the Supreme Court overruled Judge Campbell 
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court's "fail safe" provision turned out to 
be unnecessary because the Supreme Court denied the Petition as well as the Appellant's 
Petition for rehearing. 
The Trial Court's Order denying the Motion to Stay Proceedings and Continue the 
Trial fully articulates the basis for that Order. In addition to the basis set forth in the 
Court's Order it should be noted that the Appellant did not hesitate to take advantage of 
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the Utah Court's when it suited him and without making a "special appearance." 
Therefore, when the Appellant felt that he would benefit from a Temporary Restraining 
Order he applied for and received such an order restraining the Appellee from going 
forward with a baptism of the parties' daughter. The Appellant should not now claim that 
the Court lacked jurisdiction and authority (in spite of Article 16 of the Hague 
Convention) to enter a custody Order on a temporary basis or on the merits. Stichting 
Mayflower Mt. Fonds v. Jordanelle Special Services District 429 UT App. 257, 429 Utah 
Advance Reports 28 at ^ [25 (Ut. Ct. App. 2001). 
When the Appellant voluntarily refused to participate in the trial of this case he 
knowingly relinquished his rights and knowingly allowed the Trial Court to enter his 
default. Furthermore, the entry of the Appellant's default follows his history of 
neglecting these proceedings and disobeying the various Court orders including: (1) 
Appellant's failure to attend the Pre-Trial Settlement Conference on penalty of default 
after it had been continued at his request, (2) Appellant's failure to participate in 
discovery, (3) Appellant's failure to participate in the custody evaluation; and, (4) 
Appellant's failure to pay alimony and child support. The Court Commissioner had 
earlier entered the default of the Appellant and also deferred the issue for determination 
by the Judge at a later date. It should be of no help to the Appellant that his failure to 
participate in the proceedings (except when he whished or when it would benefit him) 
was based upon the same rational as his failure to participate in the Trial. 
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II THE VARIOUS TEMPORARY ORDERS OF THE STATE 
COURT DO NOT VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE UTAH 
UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT (UUCCJA) 
OR THE UTAH UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION 
ENFORCEMENT ACT (UUCCJEA). 
Appellant claims that the Trial Court and Court Commissioner violated the terms 
of the UUCCJA and the UUCCJEA. This violation occurred in the form of the lower 
Court's entry of a "child-custody determination" and, thereafter continued as the Court 
ignored the other provisions of one uniform act or the other. The Appellant has 
misunderstood the application of the uniform acts. It is obvious that neither act was 
applicable in this case because the Court did not make a "child-custody determination" 
until after the dismissal of the Appellant's Hague Convention proceeding. Even if the 
uniform acts applied the entry of a "child-custody determination" on a temporary basis, or 
on the merits, would not be a violation of either uniform act. The UUCJA did not apply 
to international custody cases except for the recognition and enforcement of custody 
Decrees of other States. Paragraph 23 of the UUCJA was vague and generally interpreted 
not to apply to international disputes except when it came to enforcing foreign Decrees. 
See The ABC's of the UUCCJEA: Interstate Child-Custody Practice Under the New Act, 
Family Law Quarterly. Vol. 32, No. 2, Summer 1998, Patricia M. Hoff. It is because the 
UCCJA was ambiguous about international issues that the UUCCJEA included the new 
Section 105 which provides that a Court of this State shall treat a foreign country as if it 
were a State of the United States for the purpose of applying Articles 1 and 2 of the act. 
The Utah adoption of the UUCCJEA did not occur until July 1, 2000. It does not appear 
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that there is any potential violation of the UUCCJEA after its effective date. 
Neither uniform act applied to these proceedings at any time. This is because by 
the time the Utah Court made a "child-custody determination" the Federal Court pursuant 
to Hague Convention had determined that the United States was the State of habitual 
residence thereby making Utah the "home state" under both uniform acts. Therefore, 
under Section 201 of the UUCCJEA (and a similar provision of the UUCCJA) Utah was 
the home State for the children permitting Utah to proceed with an initial "child-custody 
determination." Essentially, by dismissing the Appellant's Hague Court Convention 
Petition not only did the Federal Court find the United States and Utah to be the "home 
state" but the Court also found that the absences of the parties from Utah were only 
temporary and would not interfere with the requirement of six months residency 
immediately prior to the commencement of the proceedings. 
Even though the Utah Court did not make an initial "child-custody determination" 
prior to the dismissal of the Hague Court Petition the Utah Court would have been 
permitted to make such an initial "child-custody determination" under the "vacuum 
jurisdiction" provision of the uniform acts. Both uniform acts include a provision 
allowing the State to make an initial "child-custody determination" if". .. no Court of 
any other State would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), 
or (3)." Inasmuch as the children were physically residing in Utah at the time of the 
commencement of the Australia dissolution proceedings, but the Appellant claimed they 
had not been residing in Utah for six months prior to the commencement of the Utah 
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proceedings, there was a temporary vacuum or void of jurisdiction. At that point in time 
and prior to the dismissal of the Hague Court Petition, neither Court had clear jurisdiction 
over the "child-custody determination" issues. This fact together with the children's 
physical presence in Utah would vest Utah with jurisdiction under the uniform acts for 
purposes of an initial "child-custody determination." Such a determination would, 
obviously, be subject to any ruling regarding "habitual residence" under the Hague 
Convention. As it happens, "habitual residence" and therefore the children's home State 
was determined by the United States Federal Court for the District of Utah prior to the 
Utah Courts making any "child-custody determination." Furthermore, given the dismissal 
of the Hague Convention Petition which would have called for the return of the children 
to Australia if the Petition had been granted, all "child-custody determinations" by the 
Utah Courts are consistent with and authorized by the two Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Acts (the uniform acts are set forth in the Appellant's Addendum (f) and (g). 
The Hague Convention is set forth in (d) of the Appellant's Addendum and the 
International Child Abduction Remedies Act "ICARA" is (e) to the Appellant's 
Addendum). 
Ill THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO POSTPONE 
HEARINGS OR STAY THE STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS IN 
ORDER TO PERMIT THE APPELLANT TIME TO RETAIN 
COUNSEL. 
The record does not support the Appellant's claim that he was denied the right to 
counsel or due process. The Appellant employed at least two attorneys as his counsel of 
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record. There is no indication that the Appellant was impaired or restrained in his 
opportunity to retain counsel. In addition to the two attorneys he employed in the State 
Court proceedings, the Appellant employed a local attorney and a Hague Convention 
specialist in the Federal Court proceedings. Any decision of the Appellant to proceed as 
his own attorney was voluntary and knowing. There is no indication any where in the 
record that the Appellant was without funds, time or opportunity to retain counsel 
whenever he wished. In fact, the Appellant has become very adept at acting as his own 
attorney. Therefore, the failure to continue any particular proceeding to permit Appellant 
to retain counsel was not an error. In Re: Complaint Against Smith, 925 P.2d 169 (Utah 
1996). 
It is also important to note that the Appellant had counsel at the trial of this case 
but voluntary refused to participate in that proceeding. The absence of counsel or the 
opportunity to retain counsel during the pendency of the case would not have worked any 
prejudice on the Appellant and there is no evidence that he was prejudice by his failure to 
be represented by counsel during the pendency of the case. During the critical time of 
this case, from February 2001 through June 2001 the Appellant was represented by 
counsel. 
IV THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE 
EVIDENCE AND FACTS WHICH WOULD SUPPORT THE 
COURT'S FINDINGS AND HIS OBJECTIONS THERETO 
SHOULD BE DENIED. 
The Appellant has utterly failed to marshal the evidence which would support the 
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Court's Findings. The Appellant has included in his Addendum a "Trial Transcript" of 
unknown origin. It is not apparent who transcribed the record. However, assuming that it 
is a correct transcription the Appellant has had at his disposal not only the transcript of 
the trial proceedings but other proceedings which were conducted during the pendency of 
the case below. In spite of that, the Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence at his 
disposal and that failure is fatal to the numerous grounds for Appeal which appear to 
attack the Trial Judge's Findings of Fact. Marshall v. Marshall 915 P.2d 508 (Ut. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
V THE OTHER GROUNDS FOR APPEAL EACH LACK MERIT. 
The remaining issues for review stated by the Appellant lack merit. 
The Appellant sites other issues for review on Appeal. They include the 
following: 
a. The Appellant claims that the Court erred in not conducting an 
investigation through the Division of Child and Family Services. 
However, §30-3-5.2 (U.C.A. 2001) does not require that the Court 
order an investigation. An investigation is discretionary. 
Furthermore, the Court took advantage of the Appellant's suggestion 
that a custody evaluation be conducted. The Appellant, however, 
totally failed to cooperate with that custody evaluation. The custody 
evaluation conducted and completed by Dr. Natalie Malovich does 
not support any finding of abuse. 
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The Appellant takes issue with the Court's use of a Temporary 
Restraining Order requiring the return of the children during his 
visitation in June 2000. The Temporary Restraining Order was 
necessary in order to secure the return of the children who were 
being held over by the Appellant. Additionally, the evidence 
suggested that the children may be removed from the jurisdiction all 
together. The Appellant relies upon case law interpreting Rule 65A, 
Utah R. Civ. Proc. However, the Appellant ignores Rule 65A(f) 
which recognizes the equitable powers of the Courts in domestic 
relation cases. Even if the Temporary Restraining Order was 
improperly issued the Appellant has sited not prejudice which could 
be corrected on Appeal 
The Appellant complains of an alleged conflict of interest involving 
Commissioner Arnett. After the hearing before Commissioner 
Arnett the Appellant raised the issue. The Appellant alleged that 
Commissioner Arnett had years earlier represented the Appellant in 
connection with his previous divorce and on a very limited basis. 
Commissioner Arnett voluntarily recused himself from any further 
consideration of this case. The Appellant did not raise the issue 
prior to the hearing. The Appellant may have waited to see if the 
Recommendation of the Commissioner was favorable. In any case, 
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the Appellant cannot complain about an issue that he did not raise 
until after the fact 
The Appellant has misconstrued the provisions of §30-3-11 2 
(U C A 1969) This act does not require family counselling and the 
absence of any Court ordered family counselling would not have 
effected the outcome of this case and is not a proper issue for 
Appeal 
The Appellant complains that the Court did not abide by the 
provisions of §30-3-32 b [sic] OJCA 2001) Assuming that the 
Appellant refers to §30-3-32(2)(b) OJCA 2001) the Appellant 
means to attack the Courts assessment of "the child's mterests " As 
such the Appellant is attacking the Court's Finding of Fact and 
Conclusions without marshaling the evidence which was presented 
at tnal. It is significant to note that the Courts decision incorporates 
the recommendations and findings of the Court appomted expert 
custody evaluator, Dr. Natalie Malovich No evidence which would 
contradict Dr. Malovich's findings or the Court's Conclusions was 
introduced by the Appellant. 
The Appellant attacks the Court's Findings regarding child support 
and alimony. However, the Court has met the requirements of Utah 
law in entering its Findings and Conclusions to support the award. 
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The Court properly determined the parties' incomes, the needs of the 
Appellee and the apparent ability of the Appellant to assist the 
Appellee in meeting her financial needs. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court did not err in failing to stay the divorce proceedings and continue 
the Trial. The Court did not enter an initial "child-custody determination" until after the 
dismissal of the Appellant's Hague Convention Petition. Even if the Court had made 
such a ruling it would have been permissible given the vacuum of jurisdiction which 
existed up until the dismissal of the Hague Convention Petition. The Appellant has 
misconstrued the acquiescence defence in Hague Convention proceedings. 
Neither Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act precluded the Court from entering 
temporary and ultimate relief in connection with child custody. 
The Court did not err in failing to permit the Appellant additional time to seek 
counsel. The Appellant has failed to marshal the evidence which supports the Court's 
Findings and Decree and should be barred from challenging those Findings. The 
remaining issues raised by the Appellant, even if well taken, did not prejudice the 
Appellant and are not a proper subject for Appeal. 
The Court's entry of the Appellant's default was proper given the Appellant's 
failure to participate in the proceedings and his failure to appear at the Trial. 
The Appellee should be awarded her fees in connection with this Appeal. 
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DATED THIS 22nd day of March, 2002. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
TREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Petitioner/ Appellee 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
'^cjfm^ 
' . .rrK . . , ,«LEO 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 'STRICT OF UTAH 
BY: 
OFF h f ,'U **-r*-
RAJANIK KANTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CORY LEIGH KANTH, 
Defendant 
ORDER 
Case No. 2:99CV532C 
Mr. Kanth has filed this petition under the International Child Abduction Remedies Act, 
42 U.S.C. § 11601-11610 ("ICARA"), and the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International 
Child Abduction, included in the Hague Convention adopted on October 25, 1980 ("the Hague 
Convention"). Mr. Kanth alleges that Mrs Kanth wrongfully removed the children from Australia 
to the United States, and that, under the Hague Convention, the children must be returned to 
Australia so that the courts of that country can determine custody. For the reasons stated below, 
Mr. Kanth's petition is denied.1 
Background 
lfThis matter was set for oral argument on December 9,1999. However, Mr. Kanth, who now lives in New 
York, requested that oral argument be continued. Because the progress of this case lias been slow, the court was 
reluctant to grant such a continuance. Mr. Kanth agreed that the court could resolve the matter on the basis of the 
written material, without oral argument The court has now carefully considered the materials of the parties (those 
that were filed within the deadlines set by the court) and concludes that oral argument would not assist the coui 
reaching a decision. r.Q 
Mr. and Mrs. Kanth and their two daughters are citizens of the United States Mr. Kanth 
was born in India, but moved to the United States. He became a naturalized United States citizen 
in 1985. Mr, and Mrs. Kanth were married in Salt Lake City, Utah, in March 1990. Both of the 
Kanth daughters were born in Salt Lake City: Malini Amstel Kanth in 1993 and Anjana Kesari 
Kanth in 1996 
Mr Kanth is a college professor In 1993, the University of Utah denied Mr. Kanth 
tenure. Although he made application to numerous universities, he was unable to find an 
acceptable position in the United-States. In 1996, Mr. Kanth accepted a temporary academic 
position with the University of Aarhus in Denmark; he left the United States in June of that year. 
Mrs. Kanth and the children stayed in Salt Lake City until September 1996, when they joined Mr. 
Kanth in Denmark. 
The Kanths did not stay long in Denmark. Mrs. Kanth and the children returned to Salt 
Lake City in April 1997; Mr. Kanth returned in September of that year. Following their return, 
Malini enrolled in a preschool in Salt Lake City. According to Mrs. Kanth, Malini made friends in 
the preschool and generally excelled. 
Because Mr. Kanth was not able to locate an acceptable academic position in the United 
States, he again accepted a teaching position in a foreign country, at the University of New South 
Wales, Australia. Mrs. Kanth opposed the move, consenting to go only when Mr. Kanth told her 
that the family's stay in Australia would last only six months.1 The Kanth family traveled to 
*Mr. and Mrs. Kanth disagree sharply over whether they intended that their stay in Australia would be 
permanent or temporary. The evidence before the court, as discussed below, leads the court to the conclusion that 
Mrs. Kanth is correct when she states in her affidavit that neither she nor Mr. Kanth intended to permanently settle 
in Australia. 
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Australia on temporary visas, arriving in July 1997. They left behind most of their household 
furnishings and personal belongings, including many of the children's toys. These items were 
stored primarily with Mrs. Kanth's family in Salt Lake City. (See Cory Leigh Kanth AfF. Exhibits) 
(Photographs). 
The Kanth family was in Australia for a total of nine months, from July 1997 to April 
1998. While in Australia, Mr Kanth continued to seek teaching positions in the United States 
When his efforts were unsuccessful, he agreed to continue in his teaching position at the 
University of New South Wales for six months. However, Mr. Kanth did not complete this 
second six-month term. He and his family returned to Salt Lake City in April 1998. When the 
family left Australia, they broke their lease on their apartment and forfeited a $1,120 rental bond. 
Although Mrs. Kanth states that the family returned to the United States because Mr. 
Kanth had an interview at Franklin and Marshall College in Pennsylvania, a fact the court accepts 
as correct, two letters submitted to the court by Mrs. Kanth indicate that the family may have also 
left Australia as a result of Mr. Kanth's personal difficulties. The first letter is from Dr. Graham 
Voss, Associate Head of the School of Economics at the University of New South Wales. In the 
letter, Dr. Voss acknowledged that Mr. Kanth was resigning his 'Visiting position" as of April 2, 
1998. Dr. Voss stated: "Again, let me express my sympathies with your difficulties and wish you 
and your family all the best in the future." (Cory Leigh Kanth AfF. Exs. at 193) (Letter from Voss 
to Kanth of 3/30/1998). The second letter was sent by a counselor (the signature is illegible) from 
the Solution Focused Counselling Centre. The author obviously knew of problems Mr. Kanth 
was facing. The letter begins: "Thanks for the post card. Obviously you made it back to Utah 
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and memories of Australia have hopefully faded a little " (Id. at 195) (Letter of 5/11/1998). 
After giving Mr. Kanth encouragement and advice about his mental and emotional state ("I am 
impressed that you have started work on controlling your 'demons'"), the author concludes with 
the statement: "Hope you will be smiling more now that you are back in the States. Keep in 
touch" (Id.) 
Back in Utah, the children apparently settled into the routine and practices they had had 
before the move to Australia. Malina returned to the same preschool The children renewed their 
ties with Mrs. Kanth's family, with whom the children were very close. (Mrs. Kanth's family 
were the only relatives the children knew). The children were seen by Dr. Tom Metcal£ who had 
been their pediatrician since their births. (The children were seen by several different doctors for 
illnesses in Australia). 
Mr. Kanth accepted a temporary research fellowship at Harvard University, and pursued 
his interview opportunity in Pennsylvania. Mr. Kanth hoped that his Harvard fellowship would 
help him obtain a teaching position in the United States. Roger Owen of Harvard University 
wrote a letter of recommendation for Mr. Kanth. In his letter, Mr. Owen noted: 
Since leaving the University of Utah Rajani has led a somewhat peripatetic existence, 
teaching in Denmark and Australia and working on his general critique of Enlightenment 
thinking. He continues to be as productive of new ideas as ever. But he certainly 
needs somewhere to rest awhile if he is to exploit these new veins of thought to the 
fall. 
QxL at 020) (Letter from Owen to Kanlh of 5/11/1998). 
When Mr. Kanth did not find a teaching position in the United States, he accepted a three-
year position at the University of Technology ("UTS") in Sydney, Australia, and the Kanth Family 
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left for a second stay in Australia in July 1998. Again, most of the family's furniture and personal 
belongings were left behind in Salt Lake City. 
Although Mr. Kanth contends that the family intended to stay in Australia, the evidence in 
the record does not support his contention. Mrs. Kanth states in her affidavit that they left 
reluctantly for Australia, and that Mr. Kanth had assured her they would return to the United 
States by autumn in 1998 Mr. Kanth believed that he would soon have a job with Duke 
University. Mrs. Kanth1 s statement that her husband anticipated that he would be receiving a job 
offer from Duke University is corroborated by an e-mail message, sent by Mr. Kanth to Mrs. 
Kanth's father, telling him of the family's address in Sydney and asking him to "send us any 
normal mail to the new address indicated above (this is important since DUKE UNIVERSITY 
will be writing to me at your address) OR you can open the mail and read it to see what it says 
and then call us (this is better for being much FASTER.)" QdL at 056) (e-mail from Kanth to 
Meyer of 7/23/1998). 
When the position at Duke University did not materialize, Mr. Kanth continued to apply 
for other positions in the United States. In October 1998, Mr. Kanth wrote an application letter 
to Florida Atlantic University in which he declared: 
1 am specially happy to be applying to Florida Atlantic for a suitable position in 
economics. Briefly, my current status is that I am in the running for a Chair in 
economics here at the UTS, having just returned from a visiting stint at Harvard. 
However, my sights are set elsewhere: for years now, I have been seeking to return 
to the US for professional and personal reasons (my family lives in Utah.) 
(Id. at 021) (Letter from Kanth to Florida Atlantic University of 10/10/1998). 
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In a letter written to Mrs. Kanth's father in May 1999, Mr. Kanth makes clear his desire to 
find work in the United States: 
I am trying my best, as I have had for years, to find employment back in the US: 
in the very short run, this may or may not happen But the long run prospects 
remain very high given the level of my productivity It may happen as early as 
this Fall, or maybe a bit later. 
(Id. at 032) (Letter from Kanth to Meyer of 5/5/1999) 
According to Mrs Kanth, Mr Kanth feared that the time he spent as a lecturer at UTS, a 
business school, and not as a professor at a nationally-ranked university, would damage his 
academic reputation and his future job opportunities In fact, Mr Kanth was apparently so 
dissatisfied with his positon at UTS, that he considered accepting a job at the National University 
of Singapore, when an offer was extended to him in January 1999 (Id. at 027) (Letter from 
National University of Singapore to Kanth of 1/29/1999) 
During their second stay in Australia, the Kanth family again lived in rented apartments. 
According to Mrs Kanth, the family lived in a total of seven different rented lodgings during their 
two stays in Australia. 
Mr. and Mrs. Kanth disagree about the children's adjustment to their life in Australia. 
According to Mr. Kanth, the children enjoyed life in Australia and had friends and playmates 
there. Mrs. Kanth disputes this claim and goes into considerable detail about the loneliness her 
children experienced during both their stays in Australia. (Cory Leigh Kanth Aff. at 25-27.) The 
evidence is not clear on this question. For example, Malini was a student at the Randwick School 
during the family's second stay, and her December 1998 report card from the school reflected that 
she was "a very capable child" and did well in her studies. (Cory Leigh Kanth AfF. Exs. at 143) 
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(Student Progress Report). However, the teacher noted that Malini was "quite timid and 
reserved." (Id.). On the other hand, Malini's principal at the Randwick School, Peter Kensell, 
stated that "Socially, Malini had a number of close friends who enjoyed her company in the 
classroom and the playground " (Petitioner's Mem Supp. Petition Ex. J) (Letter from Kensell to 
whom it may concern of 6/23/1999). Mr. Kanth also asserts that Malini engaged in various 
extracurricular activities while in Australia, such as piano lessons and ballet However, there is 
nothing in the record that casts doubt upon Mrs Kanth's statements that Malini attended these 
activities infrequently, going to only three piano lesson and one ballet lesson (Cory Leigh Kanth 
Aff. at 26.) 
Mr Kanth has submitted several letters from professional colleagues For the most part, 
none of the letters are of particular assistance to the court because of their conclusory nature, lack 
of detail, and statements to the effect that Mr and Mrs. Kanth enjoyed a warm, loving 
relationship. Such assessments cast doubt on the accuracy of the other statements made by the 
authors, because there is no question that the relationship between Mr. and Mrs Kanth was 
deeply troubled and worsened during their stays in Australia, and by March 1999, the relationship 
between Mr. and Mrs. Kanth had deteriorated to the point that Mrs. Kanth returned to Salt Lake 
City with the children. 
Discussion 
The purpose of the Hague Convention is "to secure the prompt return of children 
wrongfully removed or retained" so that the courts of the county where the children habitually 
reside may make a determination of custody. Hague Convention. Art. 1. 
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To obtain relief under the Hague Convention, a petitioner has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the children have been wrongfully removed or retained. See 
42 U.S.C. § 11603(e)(1). A removal or retention is "wrongful" if: 
(a) it 15 in breach of rights of custody attributed to a person. . . under the law of the State 
in which the child was habitually resident immediately before the removal or retention, and 
(b) at the time of removal or retention those rights were actually exercised . . . . 
Hague Convention. Art. 3. 
The first question, then, is whether Australia was the habitual residence of the two Kanth 
daughters before Mrs. Kanth took them from Australia in March 1999 If the habitual residence 
of the children was not Australia, then there was no wrongful removal. See Ponath v. Ponatbu 
829 F. Supp. 363, 364 (D. Utah 1993) (internal citation omitted). 
The term "habitual residence" is not defined in either the Hague Convention or ICARA. 
Courts have speculated that the '"intent is for the concept [habitual residence] to remain fluid and 
fact based, without becoming rigid.'" Id_ at 365 (quoting Levesque v. Levesque. 816 F. Supp. 
662, 665 (D. Kan. 1993)). 
The Third Circuit has discussed the concept of habitual residence in detail, noting that 
although it is the child's habitual residence that must be determined, in the case of a young child, 
"the conduct and the overtly stated intentions and agreements of the parents during the period 
preceding the act of abduction are bound to be important factors and it would be unrealistic to 
exclude them." Feder v. Evans-Feder. 63 F.3d 217, 223 (3rd Cir. 1995). The court further 
explained: 
[T]here must be a degree of settled purpose. The purpose may be one or there 
may be several. It may be specific or general. All that the law requires is that 
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there is a settled purpose. That is not to say that the propositus intends to stay 
where he is indefinitely. Indeed his purpose while settled may be for a limited 
period. Education, business or profession, employment, health, family or merely 
love of the place spring to mind as common reasons for a choice of regular abode, 
and there may well be many others. All that is necessary is that the purpose of 
living where one does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly 
described as settled. 
Id (citation omitted). The court determined that: 
a child's habitual residence is the place where he or she has been physically 
present for an amount of time sufficient for acclimatization which has a degree 
of "settled purpose" from the child's perspective We further believe that a 
determination of whether any particular place satisfies this standard must focus 
on the child and consists of an analysis of the child's circumstances in that place 
and the parents' present,^ shared intentions regarding their child's presence there 
i l at 224. 
When the above definitions are applied to the facts here, it is evident that the habitual 
residence of the Kanth daughters immediately before being taken to the United States in March 
1999 was not Australia but the United States. In March 1999, Malina was almost six years old, 
Anjana three. They had spent nine months in Australia on their first stay, and approximately the 
same amount of time on their second. Although Malina had attended school in Australia, the 
evidence suggests that she may have had difficulty finding friends in school and felt isolated And 
as far as whether Anjana could be seen as settled in Australia, due to her young age, the focus 
must be dictated by the perspective of her parents. 
Also significant, and evidence that the children would not have been "acclimatized" to 
their life in Australia and would not have felt "settled" in their Australian surroundings, is the fact 
that the family lived in a succession of rented dwellings. Adding to the unfamiliarity of the 
children's surroundings, the rented accommodations in which they were living were not furnished 
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with the family's own belongings. The photographs submitted by Mrs. Kanth show that much of 
the family's furniture and personal belongings were stored while the family was in Australia. The 
stored belongings include such items as Malini's rocking chair, the children's chest and toy 
cupboard, the children's yard furniture, and Malini's bicycle and Anjana's tricycle. Such items are 
the kind that children rely on to give them a sense of home and belonging, and the Kanth children 
did not have these familiar belongings with them when they were in Australia. 
The evidence is also overwhelming the children's parents believed that their two stays in 
Australia would be temporary, and brief. Mrs Kanth adamantly insists that she went to Australia 
reluctantly, relying on her husband's assurance that the family would quickly return to the United 
States And Mr. Kanth's constant search for a teaching position in the United States, as shown by 
the numerous letters to and from colleges and universities in the United States, as well as his own 
words in his letter to Mrs. Kanth's father, undermines his present assertion that it was the family's 
intention to remain in Australia. 
In sum, Mr. Kanth has failed to show that Australia was the habitual residence of the 
children and, accordingly, his petition is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED this \H day of December, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
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ADDENDUM "B 
will— 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE D I S T ^ T O P ^ I ^ H '&£ 
CENTRAL DIVISION ^^P^^'fy/, 
RAJANI K. KANTH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CORY LEIGH KANTH, 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 2:99CV532C 
Petitioner Rajani Kanth has filed a pro se request for access to his children pursuant to 
Article 21 of the Hague Convention. However, since petitioner has filed an appeal of this court's 
order dismissing his petition, the court is without jurisdiction to consider any new filings in this 
case. 
SO ORDERED this j 1 day of December, 1999. 
BY THE COURT: 
F I L E 
COPY 
^t/yi&- UO(ynn^O^£/ 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
asb 
United States District Court 
for the 
District of Utah 
December 20, 1999 
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(718)390-3100 
Frederick N. Green, Esq. 
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10 EXCHANGE PLACE STE 622 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
JFAX 9,3635658 
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ADDENDUM "C" 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
JAN 2 4 2000 
RAJANI K KANTH, 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
COREY LEIGH KANTH, 
Respondent-Appellee 
GREEN & BERRY 
No 99-4246 
ORDER 
Filed January 19, 2000 
Before EBEL and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. 
Petitioner-appellant Rajani K. Kanth seeks an order of this court enjoining 
divorce proceedings in Utah state court during the pendency of his appeal from 
the district court's order denying his petition pursuant to the International Child 
Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610, and the Hague Convention 
on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. In order to obtain 
injunctive relief pending appeal, an appellant must show (1) that he will likely be 
successful on appeal; (2) that he will be irreparably harmed if the injunction is not 
granted; (3) that the opposing party will not be harmed if the injunction is 
granted;and (4) that the public interest does not oppose granting the injunction. 
See 10th Cir. R. 8.1. 
Upon consideration of appellant's motion and the applicable law, this court 
concludes that he has failed to demonstrate satisfaction of the above standards. 
Accordingly, his motion for injunctive relief pending appeal is denied 
Entered for the Court 
PATRICK FISHER, Clerk 
By. X.A 
Deputy Clerl 
Mr. Frederick N. Green 
Green & Berry 
10 Exchange Place 
#622 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
ADDENDUM "D' 
RECEIVED 
JUN 2 9 2001 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 GREEN & BERRY 
June 25 , 2001 
Mr. Frederick N. Green 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place, #622 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Rajani Kanth 
v. Cory Kanth 
No. 00-1630 
Dear Mr. Green: 
The Court today entered the following order in the above 
entitled case: 
The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied. 
Sincerely, 
William K. Suter, Clerk 
ADDENDUM "E 
August 27 , 2001 
RECEIVED SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK AUG 2 7 2^1 
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20543 
GREEN & BERRV 
Mr. Frederick N. Green 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place, #622 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Rajani Kanth 
v. Cory Kanth 
No. 00-1630 
Dear Mr. Green: 
The Court today entered the following order in the above 
entitled case: 
The petition for rehearing is denied. 
Sincerely, 
William K. Suter, Clerk 
ADDENDUM " F 
IN THE UNITED STATFS COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR IMS- !! N!!! ', IRl'UlI 
RAJANIK 1 AKTH 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
Appeal 
CORY LEIGH KANTH 
Respondent/Appellee. 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah, Central Division 
APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
(Oral Argument Not Requested) 
FREDERICK N. GRLEN 
GREEN & BERRY 
622 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah fc i 11. 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
RAJANIK. KANTH (Pro Se) 
c/o The Copthome Orchid Hotel 
214 Dunearn Road 
Singapore 299526 
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WPL.AlAii^O\^\iCjntn*l«»duifiU«nthctrcurt\BRIEF wpd 
Related AppeaKs ): 
I here arc iin \u\w n»i inhlnf uppcil 
VWPDATA\FN0«\K«Ui\ple«dingfM«lheireuit\8WEFi 1 
, AI>LE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT • •• ••-" 1 
A. NAIC^1 ^1 •'•-- 1 
\ J I i B. THE COURSE 01 lHi Rk< KTFDIhi i \Ni 
DISPOSITION BELOW 1 
C. STATEMENT OF THE RELEVANT FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 15 
AkuUMEN I 16 
I. i S RETURN TO UTAH WITH THE 
...HILDREN WAS NOT WRONGFUL 
.,. v . .M. THE UNITED STATES WAS THEIR 
HA.prnM RESIDS NCI 
l U 
II. . :-.Oi LbSUK ix \ - . : i ACQUIESCED IO CO^^ 
KANTH'SREH KN "O SAl 1 ! AKF'' , r? Y WITH 
THECHI1 ORFN 
CONCLUSION 
APPENDIX 
->i 
i r 
E ^WPDATA\FN3\K\KM)i^>i»J]n^\t«nlhciroiit\SRJEFwt>d 
TABLL Ol AUTHORITIES 
Cases Pages 
Re A and another (minvi-.,, u-»^-<-... i-R 929. 
CA, [1992] FAM. 106 .. . 23 
LeVesque v. LeVesque. 816 F.Sunp A P '-»6f 17 
Lord Brandon of Oak Brooke. In Re Jav ( a mmoi • auuuciuii. casiodv rights 
[1990] 2AC. ,@ P. 578; [1990] 3.W.L.R. ® P. 504; [1990] 
2.AT! ? »<• @p. 965 17 
Mereauit x Meredith. :• • c : r " 1432 (D KI. 1991) 16 
Appl,vauv>», ui iVnaUi. - •uj,1- - • P TTtah 1993) ]S, 1\ 
Rvdder v. Rvikic. v 17 
Zuker v. Andrews .} V Snpi- ' . I I M . I I r I , ,•. ivwsi 
Rules 
Inlernational Child Abduction Remedies , ,v * 
Publications 
International Child Abduction. Sandra Davis, Jeremy Rosenhlaii 
and Tanya Galbraith, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, P. 55, 
citing, C v. S. (Minor: Abduction: Illegitimate Child), (it P.55 
Concept of Habitual Residence. Dr. E. M. Clive. the Juridical Review, 
1997, Part 3, Page 137 17, 18 
E \WPDATA\FVO\KVK«iUiVpl«»dings\i«tthcireuit\BRJEF wpd 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
MM'. RE OF THE C ASE 
Petitioner/Appcllunl run in iiMn.nl iln.se pmeeednii.''. uudu the International 
Child Abduction Remedies Act. 42 11S(' :, I loOl II"!11 (iiMrn"il n- liciem ,is 
"ICARA") (Appendix Exhibit "A ", Pages 1 to 9). win, h \» I implement, the 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (sometimes 
icterred to as the \Hague Convention" or the "Convention") (Appendix Exliibit 
. > . ,uin>M alleges that the removal of the children from 
A i \\\ M 111 »\ i M i ni 11 > I ul because that was the state of habitual residence at the time 
of the rem- . tagiu. v onvention. ( orv Kanth, the 
Respondent, replies • hm.iii!.' iiui IIK I nuicii States is ttie habitual residence and 
therefore there was no wrong!nl removal 
" . THE COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND D1SPO )N 
BELOW 
Mrs. Kanth returned to the State of Utah with the partus luu MN «lnli.li en 
on March 25, 1999 The Petitioner commenced this action on Jul- H ' W' n 
-..:•.. > ;.va.ing was scheduled for August 24, 1999. At that hearing the parties' 
settle^ i tor tne dismissal of the Petition was read on the record and 
etitioner, iU/u^n present in Salt Lake City, Utah, did 
not attend the hearnij his iv, • > am M ncys approved the Stipulation. 
E ^WPDATA\FNO\K\Kjnth\ple»<lin«sUerthcircuit\BRIEF wpd 1 
x r.^igcu nis attorneys and appearing Pro Se and 
moveu iv ." : - .e; v\iucii niviion was granted on Octobei 
. i , xsss. IIICJ. v heanng IU December °> l 0 ^ prV' 
i/- the hearing the parties v^  LV -rJ * i>e b) a;nda. : id 
tit'Uimentary c\ki-;u~ o.iJ to allow ioi * •. .u.i^ - ho 
resided in the United States. Just prior iu the Decen:1* i 
moved to continue the matter, again, and in lieu thereof waived h -
hew IIIJJ t lie case was decided on the KXTH J including the Petitionei : \^ - •* 
Tin: l 'nun I'liicied ns <udei" December 1" 1999 finding that the Petitioner had 
failed li" * • * u..•; ii.v v mldien b> the Respondent because the 
Petitioner had : *v. ,nC4 , w ^ the state of habitual residence of the 
C. STATEMENT O F T H ! 
The parties are both citizens n! in," I iminl M,JH:\ ( Ailidav H ol 
Respondent, dated Augtisl 18, 1999, ^ 1 , p 2, Docket No .'<> linnii;it(n letenetl 
to as CCR espondent's Affidavi.t I"). 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married in Sail - .•• 
"i 'n\ I liiih M.iu'h o I "'"'/"u i kespondent's Affidavit I, ^ 2, p. 2, Docket No. 26.) 
3. 11 P. (i;nii" " IU\L Ivu"" diildteii o( Hie mamage, Malini, born Apul 1, 
E vwPDATA\FNO\r;\KjnthVi«»<lings\tenthcircuit\BRIEF wp<i 
i')(M M"I >uijaiu I k'l)iuar> X l'J%. (Respondent's Affidavit 1,^3, p 2, 
III I
 t , I , 4 h \ III i 
in H K h i I n n ' i in 
4. 1 In I mill I,utiil piiduMil J home and lived continuously in Sail 
Lake Cil\ I Hah Himui'li l""i"""« I'''1" I " i n m > VIIUIP IL HI! O . Lvliibif A, Part 
2 of Petitioner's Memoranda ) 
5. In 1993, Mi"", iwniii *vas denied i i" "in: ' "nn IM11 , •! I.I'". 11 
desperately searched for employment in the United States as ;i | -rofrssoi * np 
out between 90 to 150 resumes to various colleges and universities. ilowe\ • 
Kanth was unsuccessiw. Therefore, shortly following the birth of Anjana, Mi". 
I L;mtli accepted a temporary academic position with the University of Aarhus in 
I k'liiii.iil I IMiliwiicr s Afiidavil \ "»
 p hxhibit A, Part 2 of Petitioner's 
Memo? 1111»11 i 11 [)IHJM:1 rJii '. l^:spoiidciit s Allidavit 1.)\ 11, p 4, Docket No 2f>) 
6. Mr. Kanth (ell f',|« ' ^immik i " unit . * i "vo without Mis. Kanth or 
the children. They remained in Tlf.il. mini.I 1,1(11 i.-iii -.l I in Scplcmbci J.4. l'>96. 
(Respondent's Affidavit I, | " *. ^ Oc ~>5 - * • "'• 
1 Mrs, Kanth and the children left Denmark on \pnl Id I </w n til
 Mi 
Mi Kanth and returned to Salt Lake City, Utah. Upon their return to I Jta 
Kanth enrolled Malini in preschool She made many fi lends and excelled in school. 
(Rcspondenl s AiiuLivil I Ill1 \\ \(t & 20, Docket No. 26.) 
E \WPDATAVFNa\K\Kartl • I ' (, 4n*h i .i.tpWIFFwpJ •* 
8. .n (UHICV, his tamiiy in Lun »r V-nc \ l^o- He immediately 
begai. employment as a professor at colleges and universities in 1Jtah, 
xaie^ i ie sent out hundreds of resumes to 
Amen/'ir -Mw . • -. ,«< once again unsuccessful 
in luij .» u iob in me l ,!'»i *d States ^— « I," p " d 1. 4 
& \ Docket No. 26.) 
9. He did receive a six-month appointment at the v 
South Wales ill Australia, Neither Mrs. Kanth or the children \\ ••' • \ 
They voiced their opposition to Mr. Kanth on several occasioiio. xjiwvvcv r^ - * i $ 
of the famil> 's precarious financial situation,, Mr, Kanth accepted the position. He 
t«i Mi i w 11 fs.iiiin i! i" I "iiki i >iii\ be lor six months and could lead to a position in the 
I'fiitn! Stales ( n (Ins basis l"\lis kanth agieed to accompany him with the 
children (RYspod I mil •. Mi'hl.n I I || I1' |i " Docket No Jo i 
10. The Kanth farni^ 
Australia on July 1 7, 1997. Ihev It'll ,ill ul (lien tiiniisliiiuss II id personal 
belongings, other than a limited amount of clothim- • , • -
~ meeting to return within six months. (Respondent's Affidavit 1 1HJ "< I"! p " X: 3, 
"- & IJS Ducket No, 26) 
airing then nrst three weeks in Australia, the family stayed in a 
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. . v *a?er rented a fully-furnished apartment for which they 
-.jit-- \-morun .M/iiuciii ^ n i d a v i u * x r 2$ Docket No. 26.) 
I „. > controlling and auusive behavior 
Inwiu v * l ' s - * . : twcti. n f w 1 len 1 ic 
discovered she* bathed lusul m allow her 
to choose the children:*' elothinr s - called h. - -s m I' -iii ».I (Ik 
children, such as a "squaw, "Avon lady," "low clav j \ • r 
her when she brushed the children's hair and angnK crabbed the brush fr ^ 
hands if either said "ouch" He allowed her to leave the house only to take Malini 
to and iiom school and to buy groceries (~ spondent's Affidavit 1,147, p. 21, 
Doekei No jo ) 
13. Wink- lite faintly was in Australia, Mr, Kanth continued to search for 
employninil in I hi.1 I Inilai States. Ik lailcd (o obtain any offers. The family had no 
money 1" »*'Mu U '" » imini "H.ilt » Uicu'lnic, win, n (lie Univeisit> of New South 
W ales offered him a six-month extension hi .ni't-cpfr« 1 i KesjHHICICIII S Aiiidaui I, 
1ffl 21, 22, p, 8 & 9, Docket No. 26.) 
Because the family's six-month lease on their first ap.irtnienl i*\pu oJ 
they found, alternative housing. They signed another six-month lease but broke* it 
eQr,v to return, to Salt Lake after three months. (Respondent's Affidavit 1. ^ | 21, p S, 
E \WPDATA\FNO\K\Kjrth\pl«idinp\tenthcircuit\BRIEF wpd 5 
nig their entire stay in Australia, Mi Kanth kept c~-fH of each 
• »sporl i Kespondem s Ai'iidavn I "I  "I M H I" > kci Nn 'i» ) 
U nivei sity of New South Wales (It. instead, ultima! n illi Mi . K.i'iM1 in*1 j|i' 
children to the United States on April 6, 1998 in scin li i »l nupli *\ tin ii( \\w\\ 
(Respondent's Affidavit I, U 22, p. 8 & 9,. Docket No. 26.) 
1 n
 The return to Salt Lake City in March 1998 was intended to be a 
permanent relocation, to Salt I ake City. The return to Salt Lake City was 
occasioned due !u (Ik; I "dilloner's insistence and the parties' mutual dissatisfaction 
i ith 1:1 I ;:! ii life in A i isti alia (Affidavit of Respondent, dated November 30, 1999., 
Diiiknii Nn u \ in iciiudci rclcucil l<> as Respondent's Ailidavi! II, fl| 8-12, p. 3 & 
4) 
18. Mrs K rinlh <IIMII II il I I ilim in |m si liiiul iln iml \II|,III,I 
reumted with several friends and enlovnl plnvinp with thrni (kcspoiuli'iil'1, 
Affidavit 1,123, p. 9 & 10, Docket No. 26.) 
19. Mr. Kanth looked at several apartments in Salt Lake, where he also 
made many job inquiries. (Respondent's Affidavit 1,123, p. 9 & 10, Docket No. 
26.) 
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20. In the event he was not able to find a job in Utah, Mr. Kanth also 
submitted applications and resumes to several colleges and universities outside of 
Utah but within the United States. He interviewed for a position in Pennsylvania 
and traveled to Harvard to explore his connections there. (Respondent's Affidavit I, 
123, p. 9 & 10, Docket No. 26.) 
21. Mrs. Kanth received an offer of employment in Salt Lake. Mr. Kanth, 
however, refused to allow her to accept it. (Respondent's Affidavit I, f 29, p. 11 & 
12, Docket No. 26.) 
22. Mr. Kanth was again unable to find employment as a professor in the 
United States. He, therefore, accepted a position previously offered to him at the 
University of Technology, Sydney. (Respondent's Affidavit I, ^  23, p. 9 & 10, 
Docket No. 26.) 
23. Professor Kanth was never satisfied with the position at the University 
of Technology, Sydney (UTS). This position was that of a lecturer and he 
considered it a "step down" from his earlier position at the University of New South 
Wales. (Respondent's Affidavit II, f 17, p. 6 & 7, Docket No. 63.) 
24. Professor Kanth's disappointment and dissatisfaction with his UTS 
position is supported by E.K. Hunt, Economics Professor and Chair of the 
Department of Economics, University of Utah, who states: 
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" . . . UTS (University of Technology of Sydney) is a new 
college that was until recently a technical school. 
Employment at that school would generally be regarded 
by most academics as one of the least desirable positions 
in the academic world." (Affidavit of E.K. Hunt, 
November 30,1999, Docket No. 22, p. 1.) 
25. Mrs. Kanth again objected to going back to Australia. However, Mr. 
Kanth assured her that a position at Duke University would come through and the 
family would only be in Australia, for two months at the very longest. Mr. Kanth 
agreed that in the event the position at Duke did not materialize, Mrs. Kanth would 
return to Utah with the children. Based upon these representations, Mrs. Kanth 
agreed to again accompany him. (Respondent's Affidavit I, fflf 24-25, p. 10, Docket 
No. 26.) 
26. The family was scheduled to leave for Australia on July 5,1998. 
However, none of them wanted to go. They loaded the few suitcases they packed 
into a van but decided not to leave. The next day, Mr. Kanth determined the family 
would have to go. He told them to put their bags in the car. They left so quickly 
between the time he made the decision and the time they left that they barely had 
time to reload their bags. The family left reluctantly for Australia on July 6,1998. 
Their property again remained in storage. (Respondent's Affidavit I, f 29, p. 11 & 
12, Docket No. 26.) 
27. When they arrived, they negotiated a six-month lease for a fully 
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furnished home that included a car. That was the shortest lease period the Kanth's 
were able to obtain. (Respondent's Affidavit I, ^  29, p. 11 & 12, Docket No. 26.) 
28. Mr. Kanth's abusive behavior toward Mrs. Kanth worsened. He 
monitored Mrs. Kanth's time very closely. He only taught school two evenings a 
week and was at home the rest of the time. He allowed Mrs. Kanth to leave the 
home only with his permission, only for a reason acceptable to him and only for a 
specified amount of time. The infrequent occasions she was allowed to leave, he 
became enraged if she was not home at the precise time he calculated she should 
arrive. (Respondent's Affidavit 1,148-49, p. 21 & 22, Docket No. 26.) 
29. Mr. Kanth completely controlled the family's money. He refused to 
give Mrs. Kanth money for anything but necessities, such as groceries or school 
expenses for the children. The money he did give to her for these things was 
minimal. When she returned from shopping, Mr. Kanth compared the amount she 
had spent with the amount of money he had given to her. He required her to give 
him any change. (Respondent's Affidavit I, f 48, p. 21 & 22, Docket No. 26.) 
30. Mr. Kanth gave Mrs. Kanth no money with which to open a checking 
account and, because of a bankruptcy he filed in their names several years earlier, 
she was unable to obtain a credit card. (Respondent's Affidavit I, ^ f 48, p. 21 & 22, 
Docket No. 26.) 
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31. On August 29,1998, Mr. Kanth discovered that Mrs. Kanth had bathed 
the children while he was at work. He became enraged and told Mrs. Kanth she 
"couldn't be trusted", and that he would "have to figure out what to do about it". 
Mrs. Kanth asked Mr. Kanth to allow her to return to the United States with the 
children, as he earlier promised and file for a divorce. He told Mrs. Kanth in front 
of the children that she was "nothing but a squaw" and he would "rather shoot 
myself in the head than allow you and your family to raise these little girls". 
(Respondent's Affidavit I, f 42, p. 18 & 19, Docket No. 26.) 
32. On another occasion, Mr. Kanth locked Mrs. Kanth out of their 
apartment in her pajamas on a cold winter morning and refused to let her back in. 
(Respondent's Affidavit I, f 47, p. 21, Docket No. 26.) 
33. Malini was terrified to go anywhere after learning she could contract a 
deadly strain of meningitis through a sneeze from an infected person. She routinely 
asked Mrs. Kanth if she was going to die and isolated herself from others. 
(Respondent's Affidavit I, H 62, p. 25, Docket No. 26.) 
34. Malini's school attendance declined dramatically. When she did attend 
school, she generally ate lunch alone. The children in her school excluded her and 
referred to her as "our American visitor". She did not make her first friend until the 
middle of the year. (Respondent's Affidavit I, ^  62, p. 25, Docket No. 26.) 
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35. The Kanth's never planned to look for a house because they intended 
their stay to be temporary. (Respondent's Affidavit I, ^  74, p. 28, Docket No. 26.) 
36. The children were isolated. The few extracurricular activities in which 
they participated were minimal. Malini took only tliree music lessons and one ballet 
lesson the entire time they lived in Australia. (Respondent's Affidavit I, fflf 65-66, 
p. 26, Docket No. 26.) 
37. None of the jobs in the United States materialized. Mr. Kanth, 
however, continued to refuse to allow Mrs. Kanth and the children to return, as 
promised. Malini repeatedly stated she wanted to go home and asked on several 
occasions when they would return to Utah. (Respondent's Affidavit I, f 32, p. 13, 
Docket No. 26.) 
38. In January, 1999, Mr. Kanth received an offer of employment from a 
university in Singapore. Singapore is not a party to the Convention. Mrs. Kanth 
became worried about Mr. Kant's threats that he would not allow her to raise the 
children. She feared that Mr. Kanth would retain the children and she would lose 
any legal rights she might have to them. (Respondent's Affidavit I, | f 33-34, p. 13 
& 14, Docket No. 26.) 
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39. Mrs. Kanth suggested that she and the children return to the United 
States while Mr. Kanth tested the Singapore job. Mr. Kanth told Mrs. Kanth that 
"his" children would never again enter her parents' home except with him there. He 
stated that their children would be better off in India around "proper" people and the 
children. India is also not a party to the Convention. (Respondent's Affidavit I, ffl[ 
33-34, p. 13 & 14, Docket No. 26.) 
40. Since returning to Utah, Malini has become much more involved in 
school. She has not experienced any panic attacks and has become more 
extroverted, playing and associating with friends with whom she attended preschool 
prior to leaving for Australia. (Respondent's Affidavit 1,171, p. 27, Docket No. 
26.) 
41. Mr. Kanth traveled to Utah on April 3,1999. He did not appear to be 
upset that Mrs. Kanth and the children had left. He seemed relieved to be back in 
the United States. He never demanded that the children return to Australia. 
(Respondent's Affidavit I, H 35-36, p. 4 & 5, Docket No. 26.) 
42. Mr. Kanth resumed searching for employment in Utah and the United 
States. When he was again unsuccessful, he returned to his job at the University of 
Technology, Sydney on April 22,1999. (Respondent's Affidavit I, TJ 37, p. 15 & 
16, Docket No. 26.) 
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43. When Mr. Kanth told Mrs. Kanth he was returning to Australia, he 
admitted it was the only way he might regain custody of Malini and Anjana. He 
also told Mrs. Kanth that he "cared nothing for the children", she was all that 
mattered. (Respondent's Affidavit I, If 38, p. 16, Docket No. 26.) 
44. Mr. Kanth always kept a mailing address in Utah. He obtained a post 
office box and later listed Mrs. Kanth's parents' residence as his own on numerous 
receipts and applications while in Australia. (Respondent's Affidavit I, 1f 15, p. 6, 
Docket No. 26.) 
45. Mr. Kanth maintained his Utah driver's licence and eligibility to vote 
while abroad. (Respondent's Affidavit I, f 15, p. 6, Docket No. 26.) 
46. While in Australia, the children visited doctors for various childhood 
illnesses. They did not have one doctor in Australia but saw several for various 
illnesses. (Respondent's Affidavit I, If 51, p. 22, Docket No. 26.) 
47. Dr. Tom Metcalf is Malini's and Anjana's pediatrician in Utah. He has 
been their doctor since birth and has seen them on many occasions. He remained 
their primary physician while the Kanth's were abroad, examining the children each 
of the three summers they returned to the United States. (Respondent's Affidavit I, 
f 58, p. 24, Docket No. 26.) 
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48. The parties' attempts to acclimatize themselves and the children while 
in Australia failed because of: 
a. Culture differences; 
b. Mr. Kanth's refusal to permit the children to freely associate 
with their peers; 
c. The frequency of the parties' moves while residing in Australia 
(several different residences); and, 
d. The continual discussion of the family including the children 
regarding their anticipated return to the United States as soon as possible. 
(Respondent's Affidavit II, f 28(d), p. 8, Docket No. 63.) 
49. During the pendency of this Petition, as early as June 1999, Professor 
Kanth accepted a one year teaching position as Wagner College in New York. The 
Petitioner failed to disclose this new contract and teaching position as well as his 
intention to return to the United States until sometime after the initial hearing was 
scheduled. It was only when it would be to difficult to conceal his whereabouts that 
he disclosed his relocation. The Petitioner stated many times that he believed even 
once semester at a "state side" university or college would give him the opportunity 
to seek something more permanent in the United States. (Respondent's Affidavit II, 
137,40, p. 10 & 11, Docket No. 63.) 
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50. The Petitioner has now accepted yet another position, this time in 
Singapore, according to his current notice of change of address on file herein. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Hague Convention considers the removal of a child from his or her 
habitual residence wrongful. The Convention is designed to order the return of the 
child to the child's habitual residence more or less as a jurisdictional determination. 
In this case the children were not removed from their state of habitual residence but 
returned to their habitual residence in the United States of America, State of Utah. 
The term "habitual residence" is an issue of fact and not subject to hyper-
technical legalistic interpretations or tests. The case law has emphasized three 
factors in determining habitual residence: (1) the parties' intent or purposeful design, 
including the voluntariness of their decision; (2) time; and, (3) geography. Where 
the period of residence is less than one year decisions on habitual residence depend 
primarily on the parties' intention. Where the residence was less than one year, 
Courts are much more inclined to find a temporary purpose for the residence and 
therefore no change in habitual residence. 
The parties' two visits to Australia with their children were intended and 
designed to be temporary. All of their behaviors were consistent with this 
temporary design. Their furniture and personal effects were left behind in Utah. 
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They maintained a Utah address and all other legal attachments (driver's license, 
mailing address, etc.). The parties and their children moved seven times while in 
Australia. The children did not acclimatize. The Petitioner emotionally and 
physically controlled the Respondent so that she stayed on longer in Australia than 
was intended or promised. The Petitioner desparetly sought employment in the 
United States during the entire time he was in Australia. Finally, the Petitioner 
moved to New York to take a position there and has since left New York to take a 
position in Singapore. 
When Mrs. Kanth returned to Utah Mr. Kanth clearly acquiesced in the 
move. Even if her return was "wrongful" Mr. Kanth's acquiescence is a complete 
defense to any Hague Convention Petition. 
ARGUMENT 
I. CORY KANTH'S RETURN TO UTAH WITH THE 
PARTIES' CHILDREN WAS NOT WRONGFUL 
BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES WAS THEIR 
HABITUAL RESIDENCE. 
Article 3 of the Convention provides, in pertinent part, that: 
"The . . . retention of a child is to be considered wrongful 
where . . . paragraph (a) it is in breach of rights of custody 
attributed to a person . . . under the law of the state in 
which the child was habitually residence immediately 
before the removal or retention." 
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This case does not present an issue regarding Mr. Kanth's rights of custody. 
Therefore, the principal issue before the Court regards the children's habitual 
residence when Cory Kanth returned to the State of Utah on March 25, 1999. 
The terms "habitual residence" is not defined under the convention. Instead a 
child's habitual residence is to be determined by examining the specific facts and 
circumstances in each case. Zuker v. Andrews. 2 F.Supp. 2.d 134 (D. Mass. 1998); 
Meredith v. Meredith. 759 F.Supp. 1432 (D. AZ. 1991); LeVesque v. LeVesque. 
816 F.Supp. 622, 666 (D. Kan., 1993). Courts should not interpret the term 
technically or restrictively. Rydder v. Rydder. 49 F.3d 369, 373 (8 Cir. 1995). 
"The question whether a person is or is not habitually 
resident in a specified country is a question of fact to be 
decided by reference to all of the circumstances of any 
particular case." (Lord Brandon of Oak Brooke. In Re 
Jay (a minor) abduction; custody rights) [1990] 2 A.C., 
@ P. 578; [1990] 3.W.L.R. @ P. 504; [1990] 2.ALL E.R. 
@P. 965. 
Determining the fact question of habitual residence involves the consideration 
of three principal elements: (1) intent, voluntariness, or purposeful design; (2) a 
lapse of a sufficient period of time; and, (3) geography or location (see, The 
Concept of Habitual Residence. Dr. E. M. Clive, the Juridical Review, 1997, Part 3, 
Page 137, included in Respondent's Appendix as Exhibit "C", Pages 24 to 35.) 
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Application of Ponath. 829 F.Supp. 363 (D. Utah 1993) habitual residence in 
Germany was not found where the parties' visit to Germany was based upon Mr. 
Ponath's promise to return within three months. Additionally, Mr. Ponath refused to 
let his wife and child leave and the Court found that she was detained in Germany 
against her desires by means of verbal, emotional, and physical abuse. In spite of a 
ten month stay in Germany Mr. Ponath's Petition to return the child to Germany was 
denied. Judge Sam declared, "The Concept of Habitual Residence must.. . entail 
some element of voluntariness and purposeful design . . . [a] settled purpose." 
Application of Ponath. Id. @ 367. 
"Where the period of residence is less than a year there 
are decisions both ways. Much depends on purpose or 
intention in this type of case and Judges are much more 
likely to find that a temporary purpose for the residence 
prevents it from being habitual residence. " (The Concept 
of Habitual Residence. Dr. E. M. Clive, Id. @ p. 27.) 
Although it takes time to establish habitual residence, it takes no time at all to 
terminate that status. All that is required is an intention on departure to stay 
permanently in another country. See International Child Abduction. Sandra Davis, 
Jeremy Rosenblatt and Tanya Galbraith, Sweet & Maxwell, 1993, P. 55, citing, C v. 
S, (Minor: Abduction: Illegitimate Child), @ P. 55, (the summary of this case, 
together with its full citation, is attached hereto in Respondent's Appendix Exhibit 
"D", Page 36.) In C v. S an unmarried couple had a child born to them in 1987 
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while they resided in Australia. In 1990 the mother returned permanently to 
England without informing the father of her intention or preparations. Before the 
unmarried father could establish his rights of custody the Court found that the 
mother had established habitual residence in England. The former habitual 
residence in Australia had been terminated immediately upon her departure. 
In this case, the parties disagree as to their intention regarding both trips to 
Australia. Mrs. Kanth maintains that in both cases the trips were meant to be 
temporary with the specific intention to return at the earliest opportunity. 
Furthermore, Mrs. Kanth has documented that mutual intention extensively. The 
Kanth family took only clothing with them when they went to Australia on both 
occasions. They rented fully furnished apartments in Australia and moved seven 
different times. All of their important furniture and belongings remained in Utah 
anticipating their return. These belongings included personal mementos and items 
of particular significance to the children such as their toys, a child's rocking chair, 
family pictures and the like. 
Even if the parties established habitual residence in Australia during their first 
visit, which is strenuously denied by Mrs. Kanth, that status was terminated upon 
their first return to the United States. At the time of their first return in the spring of 
1998, the parties left their apartment and forfeited a substantial lease deposit. Their 
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departure was abrupt. It was occasioned by Mr. Kanth's reliance upon "psychic" 
readings and advice. Upon their return to the United States the oldest daughter was 
re-enrolled in school. The children were attended to by their historical family 
physician. All in all, their old family life resumed and went forward in Utah. 
The parties' first visit to Australia was less than satisfactory. The family 
continually discussed their imminent return to Salt Lake City. The children had not 
acclimatized or socialized well in Australia. At all times relevant to these 
proceedings Mr. Kanth maintained the family mailing address in Utah and listed it 
as his residence on his applications for employment and directed that responses be 
sent there. In fact, Mr. Kanth set in place detailed plans and instructions with his 
father-in-law regarding correspondence and communication from prospective 
employers. Mr. Kanth also listed the family's Utah address on numerous personal 
receipts and forms. He maintained his Utah driver's license and eligibility to vote. 
The Visa giving the family permission to live in Australia was for a temporary 
period. 
When Mr. Kanth could not find employment in the United States as soon as 
he had hoped, the parties saw no alternative but to return to Australia for a brief and 
temporary period of time in July 1998. Having already visited Australia the parties 
were certain that they did not want to remain. Mr. Kanth anticipated job 
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opportunities including one particular position at Duke University. Mrs. Kanth was 
reassured and promised that the second visit to Australia would be for a period of 
weeks perhaps up to six weeks at the longest. With that in mind, the family visited 
Australia once again exhibiting the same behaviors they did before but with a new 
found resolve to limit their stay in Australia all the more. For the second visit the 
parties were certain that they did not wish to reside in Australia and Mrs. Kanth was 
certain that they would not have to, but for a very brief period of time. 
Mr. Kanth attempts to minimize the significance of his extraordinary job 
search efforts. He has stated that his hundreds of applications for employment in the 
United States, while he was employed at UTS, and at the expense of UTS, 
constitute a common practice in the industry. Dr. E.K. Hunt, Professor of 
Economics and Chair of the Department of Economics at the University of Utah 
observed that such a practice is unusual: 
"I do not know a single academic who has used either 
applications or job offers in this way. I have heard stories 
of this being done. I can state, however, that it is very 
rare, and that in no case, in these stories, has a person sent 
out hundreds of applications. Where it is done, the 
individual is virtually always a famous, very highly 
regarded academic and two prestigious universities are 
'bidding' for him or her. I can assure you that Rajani 
Kanth does not fall into this category. I seriously doubt if 
any faculty member in either UTS or Wagner College fits 
this category. 
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I believe that any fair minded academic seeing an 
instructor at UTS sending out hundreds of applications 
would conclude that the instructor is desperate to leave. 
When Dr. Kanth communicated with me I definitely felt 
that he wanted desperately to leave." Affidavit of E. K. 
Hunt, dated November 30, 1999, p. 2, Docket No. 22.) 
It is during this same time, during the second visit, that Dr. Kanth's efforts to 
control the Respondent intensified, just as in the Ponath case. Not only did Dr. 
Kanth engage in emotional abuse and control, Cory Kanth was financially restrained 
from leaving and Dr. Kanth maintained physical possession of the passports until 
shortly before the Respondent's departure with the children. 
Lastly, from the children's point of view, it cannot be said that Australia was 
ever their habitual residence. The parties' oldest child, Malini, attended school but 
only sporadically. She was referred to as "the American visitor". Her accent was 
ridiculed. She ate lunch alone and only made her first friend a couple of months 
before returning to the United States. That friend only visited the Kanth household 
once to play with Malini. 
It cannot be found that a sufficient period of time elapsed in either the first 
visit or the second so as to conclude on that basis alone that Australia became the 
children's habitual residence. Therefore, the Court must discern the parties' 
intention from the objective evidence as much as possible. This was Judge 
Campbell's stated objective. Judge Campbell structured a "fast track" procedure 
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and stated in the process that she would give particular weight to the documents and 
objective evidence when comparing those facts to the parties' own testimony. In 
the process the Court properly concluded that the parties never had the proper intent 
to make Australia their residence and therefore lacked the "settled purpose" often 
referred to in Hague Convention case law. Judge Campbell was particularly 
impressed that the Kanth children never acclimatized to the Australian environment 
given the fact that there was no "settled purpose". Judge Campbell did not address 
the issue of "voluntariness", controlling behavior on the part of Mr. Kanth, or the 
emotional and physical abuse. Similarly, the Court did not address the issue of 
Professor Kanth's acquiescence. However, these two factors would also be grounds 
to sustain the Court's result. 
II. PROFESSOR KANTH ACQUIESCED TO CORY 
KANTH'S RETURN TO SALT LAKE CITY WITH 
THE CHILDREN. 
Even if Australia was the habitual residence of the Kanth family on March 25, 
1999, that status would have been terminated based upon Mrs. Kanth's return to 
Salt Lake City and Dr. Kanth's acquiescence thereto. Acquiescence is a defense to 
an otherwise well taken Hague Convention Petition. See Re A and another (minors) 
(abduction: acquiescence) [1992] 1 ALL ER 929, CA; [1992] FAM. 106, 
Respondent's Appendix Exhibit "E", Pages 37 to 54. In Re A and another (minors) 
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the Court ignored a mother's secret moving of her children from Australia to 
England by finding that the father in his letters to the mother stated that he knew of 
the mother's actions, understood they were illegal but was not going to fight the 
matter. 
Here the Petitioner wrote a letter to Marvin Meyer, the Respondent's father, 
which bears the "fax" date of April 5,1999 which is document 032 - 033 attached 
to Respondent's Affidavit I, Docket No. 26. That letters states as follows: 
"I am trying my best, as I have had for years, to find 
employment back in the US: in the very short run, this 
may or may not happen. But the long run prospects 
remain very high given the level of my productivity. It 
may happen as early as this fall or may be a bit later . . . 
I have promised to organize life differently for her; we can 
buy a house here and live normally instead of living as if 
we were leaving the next day as we have since we arrived 
in Australia. 
Of course this is up to Cory: but you are my father-in-law, 
and about the only family I have left, and I want you to be 
assured that the basis exists now-as it has for some time 
now- for normalcy in our lives battered as we have been 
thus far by frequent moves. 
If Australia does not please her, and this is important for 
you to know, I am ready now to return to Utah and look 
for employment there, no matter what it takes. 
. . . I have a permanent job here, Cory will have one to. 
But only if she chooses to: if not, I will try to find a 
similar set up in the US asap so the kids and Cory can be 
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close to family again. It is for this reason that I have spent 
the last five years applying to jobs in the US." 
Once again, the Petitioner made good on his expectation. Before this case 
had even reached its first hearing, Dr. Kanth had accepted a position in New York 
at Wagner College although he failed to disclose that fact in time for the first 
hearing, August 24, 1999. The Wagner College posting was for a period of one 
year. Dr. Kanth testified that he still had his UTS position waiting for him. While 
this matter has been on appeal Dr. Kanth has taken yet another position in 
Singapore, thus continuing the "peripatetic existence" that the parties had 
experienced for years, ("Order" Judge Tena Campbell, December 14,1999 at Page 
4 quoting the letter from Owen to Kanth of May 11,1999, document page number 
020, exhibits to Respondent's Affidavit I, Docket No. 26.) 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Kanth's return with the parties' children to Utah was not wrongful. The 
United States, State of Utah was and remains the childrens' habitual residence for 
purposes of the Hague Convention. All of the parties' actions were consistent with 
their intention to live in Utah. Their visits to Australia were purely temporary. The 
children never became attached to the Australian residence or environment. 
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Even if the removal of the children was wrongful, Mr. Kanth acquiesced to 
their return. During the pendency of this case Mr. Kanth has relocated to the United 
States which effectively moots any claim under the Hague Convention. 
The Order of Judge Tena Campbell dismissing the Petition should be upheld. 
DATED THIS / ^ day of March, 2000. 
GREEN & BERRY 
FREDERICK N. GREEN 
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee 
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